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Airborne transmission has been recognized as a major transmission pathway for the infectious disease 
COVID-19. This study investigated the effectiveness of several indoor air quality (IAQ) control strategies 
on the mitigation of airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. The well-
known airborne disease infection risk model (Wells-Riley equation) was used to estimate the infection 
risk of the SARS-CoV-2 in seven (7) different types of spaces including conference center/ballrooms, 
hotel bistro//cafeteria, hotel lobby, classrooms (lecture), conference room/small classroom, hotel or cruise 
ship guest rooms and open plan offices. The IAQ control strategies included increased ventilation rate, 
improved air distribution system and filtration, semi-open space partition, in-room air purification and 
disinfection, and personal protective equipment. The effectiveness of each individual strategies and 
selected combined strategies were evaluated using the risk estimation model. Several integrated (layered) 
mitigation strategies were recommended and classified based on their relative cost and effort of 
implementation. In addition, the potential of several selected air cleaning/disinfection products was also 
evaluated. 
1. Introduction 
The unprecedented coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic caused by the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has made more than 54.6 million people infected and 
1,321 thousand people dead globally and 11.1 million people infected and 246 thousand people dead in 
the U.S. by November 16th, 2020 [1,2]. There are typically three possible transmission routes of infectious 
respiratory viruses: (1) the fomite route through direct contact with pathogen sources or indirect contact 
with contaminated surfaces, (2) droplet-borne route transmitted by medium (5-100µm) or large droplets 
(>100µm), and (3) airborne route (short-range and long-range) through aerosols (<5µm) (Fig. 1). The 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 through the fomite and droplet-borne routes have traditionally been 
considered as the main paths, but more and more recent studies have revealed the possibility of airborne 
transmission, particularly in buildings with poor ventilation [3]. Some studies have identified airborne 
transmission as a likely major route for asymptomatic person-to-person transmission of SARS-CoV-2 [4–
6].  
In order to reduce the infection risk in indoor environments, various indoor air quality control strategies 
have been suggested to mitigate the airborne transmission, including source control, ventilation, and air 
cleaning/filtration across multiple scales from a whole building to zones and rooms, and to cubical and 
personal microenvironments [7,8]. However, the effectiveness of these strategies for reducing the risk of 
COVID 19 infection has not been well evaluated for specific indoor spaces such as open-plan offices, 
classrooms, hospitality guest rooms, restaurants, and cruise line guest cabins, where airborne transmission 
are more likely to occur due to high occupancy densities. 
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Fig. 1 Illustration of different transmission routes of infectious respiratory viruses, adapted from [9]. 
 
2. Goal and Objectives 
This work was in direct response to Carrier’s Research Opportunity on “Effectiveness of Building 
Systems Strategies for Mitigation of Airborne Transmission of SARS-COV-2”. The goal was to identify 
evidence-based building systems strategies for mitigating airborne transmission and evaluate their relative 
effectiveness for specific indoor spaces, including open-plan offices, classrooms, hospitality guest rooms, 
and cruise line guest cabins. It was accomplished through the following specific objectives: 
1) Develop a method and procedure to estimate the risk of COVID 19 infection associated with 
airborne transmission based on the estimation of the inhalation dose exposure to SARS-CoV-2; 
2) Define baseline cases and estimate their infection risks for specific indoor spaces including open-
plan offices, classrooms, hospitality guest rooms, and cruise line guest cabins under the current 
typical indoor configurations and HVAC system design and operation;  
3) Identify mitigation strategies feasible for each of the specific spaces, including system retrofits 
and modifications to system operation and controls; and 
4) Evaluate the effectiveness of the identified retrofit and control strategies in reducing the risk of 
infection relative to the baseline conditions and select the most effective ones and their 
combinations. 
3. Methods 
This study adopted a widely used empirical model with well-established baseline cases to evaluate the 
performance of different mitigation strategies. 
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3.1. Theoretical model 
3.1.1. Wells-Riley model 
One widely used approach for estimating the infection risk of airborne transmission in enclosed 
environments is the well-known Wells-Riley equation [10,11]. The model (Eqn. 1) is usually used to 
model the infection risk assuming a steady-state and well-mixed indoor environment. This model has also 
been extended by other researchers to include unsteady exposure [12] and imperfect mixing [13,14]. The 
modification of the original model for the unsteady-state and imperfect mixing condition will be 
discussed in more detail in the subsequent subsections. The infection possibility (P) is calculated as a 
function of the inhalation exposure dose [15], which depends on the number of virus carrier at the start of 
the exposure period (I), the infectious quantum generation rate per virus carrier (q), the fraction of 
infectious particle penetration through the mask (R), pulmonary ventilation rate (p), exposure time (t) and 




= 1 − 𝑒−𝑅𝑆𝑅𝐼
𝐼𝑞𝑝𝑡
𝑉𝛬                                                                      (1) 
where NC is the number of new cases, and NS is the number of susceptible people. The fraction of 
infectious particle penetrated through the mask or respirator for susceptible (RS) and infected (RI) 
population can be calculated by Eqn. 2 and 3, respectively, in which both depend on the mask filtration 
efficiency (ηS or ηI). The penetration fraction (R) equals 1 when no mask or respirator is used during the 
exposure period. An additional fractional factor (fR) is multiplied by the original filtration efficiency of the 
mask to represent the fraction of time using a mask/respirator over the entire exposure period. It equals 1 
when the mask is worn during the entire exposure period.  
𝑅𝑆 = 1 − 𝑓𝑅,𝑆𝜂𝑆                                                                          (2) 
𝑅𝐼 = 1 − 𝑓𝑅,𝐼𝜂𝐼                                                                           (3) 
The equivalent air change rate (Λ) represents the equivalent total fresh/clean supply airflow rate for 
diluting the infectious virus concentration in the room air or the removal rate of the infectious viruses 
averaged over the room volume (i.e., total fresh/clean air delivery rate per unit of room air volume). It 
depends on the equivalent ventilation rate (λvent), pathogen inactivation rate by ultraviolet germicidal 
irradiation (UVGI) systems (kUV) and infectious particle deposition rate (kdeposition), as shown in Eqn. 4. 
The equivalent ventilation rate includes the total equivalent fresh air supplied by the HVAC system (λHVAC) 
and infectious particle removal rate by portable air cleaners (kAirCleaner). The fraction (f) of operation time 
over the entire exposure period is applied to each term in Eqn. 5 to determine the overall ventilation rate.  
The fresh/clean air change rate supplied by the HVAC system (λHVAC) includes the outdoor part and the 
recirculated part. The recirculated fresh/clean air change rate (Eqn. 6) depends on the recirculated air 
change rate (λrecirculated) and the filtration efficiency of the filters in the HVAC system for the virus-
containing particles (ηfilter).  
𝛬 = 𝜆𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑓𝑈𝑉𝑘𝑈𝑉 + 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛                                                 (4) 
𝜆𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑓𝐻𝑉𝐴𝐶𝜆𝐻𝑉𝐴𝐶 + 𝑓𝐴𝑖𝑟𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑘𝐴𝑖𝑟𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑟                                      (5) 
𝜆𝐻𝑉𝐴𝐶 = 𝜆𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑟 + 𝜆𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝜂𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟                                             (6) 
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A portable air cleaner can supply additional fresh/clean air to the space. The infectious particle removal 
rate (or fresh air supply rate) by air cleaners (kAirCleaner) can be estimated by its airflow rate (λAirCleaner) and 
filter efficiency (ηAirCleaner), or based on its clean air delivery rate (CADR) and room volume (V):  
𝑘𝐴𝑖𝑟𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑟 = 𝜆𝐴𝑖𝑟𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑟𝜂𝐴𝑖𝑟𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑟 =
𝐶𝐴𝐷𝑅
𝑉
                                       (7) 
The actual ventilation rate (λvent) is a spatial-variable that depends on the particular location in the space. 
Thus, an additional factor will be applied to the original equation in Eqn. 5 to adapt it to imperfect mixing 
scenarios. The infectious particle removal rates due to UVGI systems and deposition, and the fresh air 
supplied by air cleaners are assumed to be uniform in the whole space. Therefore, these terms do not have 
to be modified for imperfect mixing.  
The pathogen removal rate by the UVGI system depends on the fraction of UVGI operation time (fUV) and 
the pathogen inactivation rate due to UV irradiation (kUV). The infectious particle deposition rate (kdeposition) 
relies on an approximate estimate of gravitational settling (Eqn. 8) from Nicas et al. [16], which depends 
on the particle diameter (dp) and room height (H). It is assumed that the deposited particles will not be 








                                                   (8) 
The pathogen natural inactivation rate is not considered in this study, in part because of the lack of 
existing data on the size-resolved natural inactivation rate of SARS-CoV-2 and in part because quanta 
generation rates (q), when back-calculated using Eqn. 1, will inherently account for any inactivation that 
occurred during the case study period [10]. 
3.1.2. Model modification for imperfect mixing 
The original Wells-Riley model is based on the perfect-mixing assumption for room air. However, room 
air is typically not well-mixed in real scenarios. The indoor airflow pattern is highly dependent on room 
configurations (e.g., layout and furniture placement) and ventilation methods (e.g., displacement 
ventilation). In an imperfectly mixed space, the local ventilation rate (λvent) is a spatial-variable that 
depends on the particular location in the space. If the amount of exhaled breath generated by the infectors 
and inhaled by a susceptible person in a particular spatial location is known, the susceptible persons’ 
infection risk can be estimated [11]. This can be done by conducting tracer gas measurements, which 
tracer gas is released from the locations of the infectors and the concentrations of the tracer gas at the 
locations of each susceptible person are then measured. It can also be obtained numerically by 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) [17,18]. 
To incorporate this approach in our modified Wells-Riley model, a factor of ventilation efficiency εvent is 
applied to the ventilation rate in the model. The infectious particle removal rates due to UVGI systems 
and deposition, and the fresh air supplied by air cleaners are assumed to be uniform in the whole space, 
therefore, these terms do not have to be modified to adapt the imperfect mixing condition. Then Eqn. 5 
can be rewritten as: 
𝜆𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑓𝐻𝑉𝐴𝐶𝜆𝐻𝑉𝐴𝐶𝜀𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑓𝐴𝑖𝑟𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑘𝐴𝑖𝑟𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑟                                        (9) 
The ventilation efficiency (εvent) represents the dilution efficiency in a particular location compared to the 
perfect mixing ventilation, thus can be estimated by comparing the tracer gas (usually carbon dioxide) 
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concentration in this location (Ci) and the concentration in the exhaust air (Cexhaust) by Eqn. 10. It equals 1 




                                                                     (10) 
The measurement or simulation data in literature or our previous studies will be used to estimate the 
empirical ventilation efficiencies of different ventilation or airflow patterns in this study. If the modified 
Wells-Riley model is applied to the population in the room, instead of each individual separately, then the 
ventilation efficiency (εvent) will also adopt the average level for the entire population in the space, more 
specifically, in the breathing zone. The combined effect of ventilation efficiency should be considered 
when applying multiple ventilation methods (i.e. HVAC system, natural ventilation, and air cleaner) 
together. Then a combined ventilation efficiency should be used obtain the combined ventilation rate, 
instead of being calculated separately as in Eqn. 9.  
For different ventilation and airflow patterns, such as displacement ventilation (DV), personal ventilation 
(PV), or ventilation in semi-open space (e.g. workstation with partitions), the ventilation efficiency may 
vary greatly. According to a literature review by Zhang [8], the ventilation efficiencies of some HVAC 
ventilation approaches are shown in the table below. 
Table 1. Ventilation efficiencies of different HVAC ventilation approaches in literature. 
Ventilation mode Ventilation efficiency (εvent) Ref. 
Displacement ventilation (DV) 1.2 – 2  Per analysis of the data in [19] 
Semi-open space 1.1 – 3.6 (typically 2 – 3) Per analysis of the data in [20,21] 
Semi-open space + DV  14 – 100 Per analysis of the data in [22] 
Personal ventilation 1.4 – 10 Per analysis of the data in [23] 
 
3.2. Key parameters 
3.2.1. Infectious quantum generation rate per infector (q) 
One quantum in the risk model represents an infectious dose that would infect 63% of the 
population with the exposure per the Wells-Riley Equation, i.e., the infection dose ID63 (Riley et 
al. 1978). The infectious quantum generation rate (q) has a unit of quanta per hour (h-1), and is 
typically back-calculated from epidemiological studies. It describes the number of infectious 
particles/pathogens in a way that implicitly includes both the number of virus particles generated in time 
and the infectivity of particles (which also inherently captures particle size effects and probability of 
deposition in appropriate regions of the respiratory system) [10]. The magnitude of q depends on the 
specific disease type, the original epidemiological case study, the interventions, and the activity intensity 
of the infected [10,24]. Currently, there are limited data available for the quantum generation rate of 
different diseases, especially for SARS-CoV-2. Another parameter typically used to evaluate the 
infectious risk of a disease is the basic reproduction ratio (R0). The basic reproduction ratio is the classical 
epidemiological measure associated with the reproductive power of the disease. R0 provides a threshold 
for the stability of the disease-free equilibrium point. When R0 < 1, the disease dies out; when R0 > 1, an 
epidemic occurs [25]. Table 2 lists the R0 and q of some diseases from literature.  
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Table 2 R0 and q of some diseases from literature. 
Disease q [h-1] R0 [-] Ref. 
Influenza 15-500a 1.6-3.0 [10,26] 
Tuberculosis 1-50b 2.2-5.5 [10,26] 
SARS 10-300 2.0-5.0 [10,26] 
MERS 6-140 0.5-1.2 [26] 
Measles 570-5600 11.0-18.0 [10,26] 
a 67 and 100h-1 are both commonly used. 
b 13h-1 is commonly used. 
For SARS-CoV-2, there are very limited available data regarding its q and R0. The widely used R0 of 
SARS-CoV-2 is between 2.0 and 2.5 [26–31], which is close to influenza, TB, and SARS. Therefore, the 
q of SARS-CoV-2 is supposed to be close to influenza, TB, and SARS as well. Dai and Zhao [26] 
analyzed the statistical relationship between R0 and q of MERS, TB, influenza, and SARS, and estimated 
an approximate q between 14 and 48 h-1 using the curve-fitting approach. However, due to the limited 
available data, the fitted relationship between R0 and q may not be accurate enough for estimating the q of 
SARS-CoV-2. Buonanno et al. [24] used a novel approach for predicting the viral load emitted by a 
contagious subject on the basis of the viral load in the mouth, the type of respiratory activity (e.g., 
breathing, speaking, whispering), respiratory physiological parameters (e.g., inhalation rate), and activity 
level (e.g., resting, standing, light exercise). It revealed that q could be lower than 1 h-1 in resting state, 
and greater than 100 in light activity and vocalization state. A typical q of 142 h-1 was estimated based on 
their results for a case who is speaking and doing light exercise. Miller et al. [32] reported a q as high as 
1000 h-1 level for a super spreader.  
3.2.1.1. Back-calculation for estimating q value of SARS-CoV-2 
3.2.1.1.1. Guangzhou restaurant 
In this study, we used several real outbreak events to back-calculate the quanta number of SARS-CoV-2. 
The first case is the outbreak event happened in a Guangzhou restaurant in January 2020 [33,34]. There 
were totally 18 tables and 89 people in the room, and nobody wore masks during the exposure event. The 
initial infectious patient (A1) was sitting in table A (Fig. 2). All other people were not infected before the 
instance. The room has a volume of 431 m3 (height of 3.14 m, length of 17 m, and an average width of 
8.1m). The exposure duration is assumed to be 1h (53 min and 73 min for table B and C, respectively, 
according to [33,34]). The tracer gas decay experiments showed that the equivalent outdoor air supply 
was 0.75-1.04 L/s·person [34]. Eventually, a total of 9 people were found to be infected (all sitting on 
table A, B, and C), of which 4 people on table A (same table with the infected), 3 people on table B, and 2 
people on table C. Assuming that all 9 people were infected due to the airborne transmission, then q 
equals to 175-208h-1 (depends on the outdoor air supply) based on the proposed steady-state perfect-
mixing risk model (Eq. 1). Due to the room and ventilation system configuration, the CFD simulation 
showed that the indoor air might not be ideally well mixed, and air circulation happened within the local 
zone (ABC zone). Then if only the ABC zone is used as the confined space for estimation, q will become 
209-253 h-1. The target ABC zone is 3.2 by 8.4 m with a height of 3.14 m, and totally 20 susceptible 
people were in this zone. 
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Fig. 2 Room configuration of the target case, from [34]. 
3.2.1.1.2. Hunan coach and bus [35–37] 
Another case study we used was the COVID-19 outbreaks on a tour coach and a bus in Hunan in March 
2020. Both outbreaks were caused by the same patient. For the outbreak on the coach (Fig. 3), there were 
totally 49 people (48 susceptible and 1 infectious) on the vehicle (11.3m long and 2.5m wide). The 
available height is assumed to be 2.5m as well. Most people on the vehicle did not wear masks during the 
travel, and all the infected patients did not wear masks. Thus, the number of people who wore masks is 
assumed to be zero in this study. The total travel time was 2 hours, and the vehicle was fully confined 
with all windows closed during the travel (no natural ventilation). The HVAC system was on, and Li 
presented an outdoor ventilation rate of 1.72L/s·person in the coach [38]. Eventually, 8 people were 
infected during this travel. According to the proposed model, the estimated q is 86 h-1.  
 
Fig. 3 COVID-19 outbreak in a Hunan tour coach [37]. 
For the outbreak on the bus (Fig. 4), there were totally 13 people (12 susceptible and 1 infectious) on the 
vehicle (5.5m long and 2.5m wide with 18 seats). The available height is assumed to be 2.5m. Only one 
out of 12 passengers on the vehicle wore the mask during the travel. The travel is 1 hour long, and the 
vehicle was fully confined with all windows closed during the travel (no natural ventilation). The HVAC 
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system was on, and Li presented an outdoor ventilation rate of 3.22L/s·person in the bus [38]. Eventually, 
2 people were found to be infected due to this travel. The passenger wore the mask did not get infected. 
According to the proposed model, among the passengers without masks, the estimated q is 47h-1. 
 
Fig. 4 COVID-19 outbreak in a Hunan bus [37]. 
3.2.1.1.3. Other outbreak cases 
Other outbreak events we found did not provide detailed information regarding the building configuration 
or ventilation conditions, which may cause a big uncertainty on the estimated q values. One is the 
outbreak in a tour coach in Zhejiang [39]. A total of 23 people out of 67 people got infected after a 100 
min travel with an index patient in a tour coach. The outdoor ventilation rate is not available for this case. 
Considering its similarity to the Hunan coach, the ventilation rate of the Hunan coach case 
(1.72L/s·person) is adopted for back calculation. According to the proposed model, the estimated q is 
405h-1.  
The last case is the Seoul call center outbreak event [40]. A total of 78 people out of 136 people in the call 
center were confirmed to be infected after 9 working days (assuming 8-hour working time for each 
working day) since the first case got infected. The outdoor ventilation rate is not available for this case. 
Then, a ventilation rate required by ASHRAE 62.1 (5L/s·person) is adopted. Assuming all cases were 
infected by the index patient through airborne transmission, based on the proposed model, the estimated q 
is 113h-1. However, the estimation of q for this case may have a large uncertainty since many assumptions 
were made during the estimation. 
3.2.1.2. Estimated q in other studies 
Table 3 summarized the estimated q from other studies about the SARS-CoV-2 published so far. The 
estimated value of q varied as low as 1 h-1 up to 970 h-1. In this study, the q is assumed to be 100 h-1 to 
represent a mid-level generation rate. 
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Table 3 Estimated q of SARS-CoV-2 from different studies. 
Activity q [h-1] Note Ref. 
Estimated using the Wells-Riley model for real outbreak events 
Singing  970±390 Skagit Valley Chorale superspreading event [32] 
Light activity 0.225 For health care workers [41] 
Seated+eating/speaking 209-253 Guangzhou restaurant case in [33,34] This study 
Sedentary in a tour coach 86 Hunan coach case in [37,38] This study 
Sedentary in a minibus 47 Hunan minibus case in [37,38] This study 
Sedentary in a tour coach 405 Zhejiang coach case in [39] This study 
Seated+speaking 113 Seoul call center case in [40] This study 
Estimated using medical models    
Resting <1  [24] 
Intermediate  ≤100 Estimated based on the viral load in the sputum  
Light activity+vocalization >100   
Light exercise+speaking 142  [24] 
Estimated using statistical methods    
Sedentary state 14-48 
Estimated based on the fitting curve between q and 
R0 from the data of other respiratory diseases (e.g. 
influenza and SARS) 
[26] 
Adopt the data estimated by other studies 
Light exercise+speaking 142 Use the data estimated by [24] [42] 
Light exercise+speaking 142 Use the data estimated by [24] [43] 
Speaking in classroom 2 
In the original paper, the assumed q is 1h-1 with a 




3.2.2. Pulmonary ventilation rate (p) 
Table 4 shows the short-term inhalation rates by activity level for people of different ages, which is from 
the Exposure Factors Handbook [45] released by USEPA. The activities in the office/classroom/guest 
room are usually at sedentary/passive or light-intensity level. Most related studies use 0.3 m3/h as the 
pulmonary ventilation rate [10,26,44], which is the mean level for sedentary/passive activities. This value 
was also used in the present study. 
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Table 4 Short-term inhalation rates, by activity level (adapted from [45]). 
Age [years] 
Short-term inhalation rates [m3/h] 





Mean 95th  Mean 95th  Mean 95th  Mean 95th  Mean 95th  
0-1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.6 2.5 
1-2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.3 3.1 
2-3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.3 3.2 
3-6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.6 2.2 2.9 
6-11 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.5 
11-16 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.9 4.2 
16-21 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.6 2.2 2.9 4.4 
21-31 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.6 2.3 3.0 4.6 
31-41 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.6 2.2 2.9 4.3 
41-51 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.7 2.3 3.1 4.6 
51-61 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.7 2.4 3.2 4.7 
61-71 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.8 4.0 
71-81 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.5 1.9 2.8 3.9 
≥81 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.5 1.9 2.9 4.1 
 
3.2.3. Removal efficiency of filters for infectious particles (ηfilter) 
The particle removal efficiency of filters used in the HVAC system is usually rated by Minimum 
Efficiency Reporting Values (MERVs). MERVs report a filter's ability to capture particles between 0.3 
and 10µm. Table 5 lists the efficiency of MERV-rating filters for different particle size range, which is 
available in ASHRAE 52.2 [46].  
Table 5 Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV) ratings in ASHRAE 52.2 [46]. 
MERV 
Particle removal efficiency [%] 
0.3-1μm 1-3μm 3-10μm 
1   <20 
2   <20 
3   <20 
4   <20 
5   ≥20 
6   ≥35 
7   ≥50 
8  ≥20 ≥70 
9  ≥35 ≥85 
10  ≥50 ≥85 
11 ≥20 ≥65 ≥85 
12 ≥35 ≥80 ≥90 
13 ≥50 ≥85 ≥90 
14 ≥75 ≥90 ≥90 
15 ≥85 ≥90 ≥90 
16 ≥95 ≥95 ≥95 
HEPA ≥99.9 ≥99.9 ≥99.9 
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As a conservative approach, the lower bound of removal efficiency for each particle size range in 
ASHRAE 52.2 [46] (i.e. MERV 11-16 filters for 0.3-1μm particles, MERV 8-16 filters for 1-3μm 
particles, and MERV 5-16 filters for 3-10μm particles) is used to estimate the particle-size-weighted 
average filter efficiency. For values not specified in ASHRAE 52.2 (i.e., MERV 1-10 filters for 0.3-1μm, 
MERV 1-7 filters for 1-3μm, and MERV 1-4 filters for 3-10μm), the average value of 1st percentile of the 
filtration efficiency distributions (P1%) from Dillon and Sextro [47] is calculated for each particle size 
range. If P1% was not given for a specific MERV rating filter (i.e., MERV 1-4, 6, 9, and 10), the efficiency 
of the closest lower MERV-rating filter is adopted, which is the same approach as used in [44]. Filtration 
efficiency of 10% is assumed for MERV 1-4 filters for 3-10 μm since it’s not specified by ASHRAE 52.2 
or Dillon and Sextro [47].  
Virus can be contained in particles of different sizes. Data from existing literature show that in non-
hospital environment, approximately 20%, 30% and 50% of the viruses are contained in 0.3-1μm, 1-3μm 
and 3-10μm, respectively [44]. This assumption was also adopted to determine the particle-size-weighted 
virus filtration efficiency (Table 6). 
Table 6 Assumed particle removal efficiency of different filters for 0.3-1µm, 1-3µm, 3-10µm, and total 
particle-size-weighted average. 
MERV 
Particle removal efficiency ηfilter [%] 
0.3-1μm 1-3μm 3-10μm Particle-size-weightedb 
1 0 0 10 5 
2 0 0 10 5 
3 0 0 10 5 
4 0 0 10 5 
5 3 17 20 16 
6 3 17 35 23 
7 9 17a 50 32 
8 9 20 70 43 
9 9 35 85 55 
10 9 50 85 59 
11 20 65 85 66 
12 35 80 90 76 
13 50 90 90 82 
14 75 90 90 87 
15 85 90 90 89 
16 95 95 95 95 
HEPA 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
a The average efficiency of MERV 7 for 1-3μm is 33% based on the values specified in [47]. However, the lower bound of MERV 8 for 1-3μm in 
ASHRAE 52.2 is 20% [46]. Since the efficiency for the same particle size range of the higher MERV-rating filter is usually equal or greater than 
the lower MERV-rating filters, the efficiency of the closest lower MERV-rating filter (i.e. MERV 6) is adopted as the efficiency of MERV 7 filter 
in this study.  
b Assuming 20% of infectious particles are in 0.3-1µm size, 30% are 1-3µm, and 50% are 3-10µm [44]. 
3.2.4. CADR of portable air cleaners 
Clean Air Delivery Rate (CADR) is the “equivalent” volumetric airflow rate (CFM or m3/h) that has had 
all the particles of a given size distribution removed. Many studies reported the CADRs of different air 
cleaners. There are also numerous air cleaner products available on the market. Liu et al. [48] reviewed 
the efficiency and cost of some commonly-used air cleaners around the world (Table 7). The CADRs 
vary greatly depending on their specific air purifying technologies. Generally, the CADRs are roughly 
between 300 and 800 m3/h (or between 180 and 480 CFM) for different air cleaner products.  
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Another approach to estimating the infectious particle removal is based on the multiplication of airflow 
rate and the single-pass filtration efficiency, which is the same method of calculation of recirculated clean 
air in an HVAC system with a filter in the recirculation or mixed-air duct. The efficiency of different 
filters can be found in Table 6. 
Table 7 CADR of different air cleaners from the literature [48]. 
Origin  Brand CADR [m3/h] CADR [CFM] 
Europe Philips  301-910 177-536 
 Blueair 105-800+ 62-471 
 Electrolux 193.5-439 114-258 
Japan Sharp 312-800 184-471 
 Panasonic 322-700 190-412 
 Daikin 200-500 118-294 
US Honeywell 243-700 143-412 
China Yadu 360-588 212-346 
 Broad 240-2000 141-1177 
 Lexy 100-840 59-494 
 TCL 220-403 129-237 
South Korea Samsung 179-719 105-423 
 
3.2.5. Removal efficiency of different masks on infectious particles (ηS and ηI) 
Face masks provide air filtration at a personal level for wearers. It is a critical means for reducing the risk 
of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Therefore, it is highly recommended by WHO. According to the existing 
studies, face masks can reduce the average emission rate by around 30%, 50% and 95% with cloth, 
surgical and N95 masks, respectively. Mueller et al. [49] conducted a quantitative analysis to compare the 
particle removal efficiency of different types of masks, which is shown in Table 8. Konda et al. [50] 
measured the mask filtration efficiency for particles in different sizes in Table 9. Considering the 
infectious particle size distribution assumption in this study, the particle-size-weighted efficiency is 32%, 
44% and 95% for cloth, surgical and N95 masks, respectively, which is close to our assumption.  
Table 8 Particle removal efficiency of different masks. 
Masks Particle removal efficiency ηS and ηI [%] 






Cloth <30 to 91 
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Table 9 Mask filtration efficiency for 0.3-1µm, 1-3µm, 3-10µm and total particle-size-weighted average. 
Mask 
Particle removal efficiency ηfilter [%] 
0.3-1μm 1-3μm 3-10μm Particle-size-weightedc 
Cloth (cotton/silk, with gap)a 27 33 34 32 
Surgical (with gap)a 41 44 45 44 
N95b 95 95 95 95 
a Calculated average value of the data measured in [50]. 
b Assuming 95% for all size ranges. The measured efficiency in [50] is larger than 95%. 
c Assuming 20% of infectious particles are in 0.3-1µm size, 30% are 1-3µm, and 50% are 3-10µm [44]. 
3.2.6. Particle deposition 
The same particle size bins as those used for HVAC filter MERV ratings are considered here to simplify 
the calculation; values are calculated using the geometric mean diameters for each particle size bin (i.e., 
0.55μm, 1.7μm, and 5.5μm for particles of 0.3-1μm, 1-3μm, and 3-10μm, respectively [44]). The particle 
deposition rate can be calculated by Eqn. 8. 
 
3.3. Baseline case development 
Four typical types of buildings or indoor spaces were studied in this research, i.e., office buildings, 
educational buildings, hotels, and cruise line. First of all, the typical configurations of the four types of 
space were defined in terms of the space layout, HVAC system, occupancy density and schedule, and 
system control strategy. Then specific spaces based on the input from Carrier were defined. 
3.3.1. Space layout 
3.3.1.1. Floor plan 
The four types of buildings are all complex indoor spaces which contains rooms of different functions. 
The medium-sized office model, primary school model, and large hotel model from the DOE prototype 
building models are selected as the baseline case in this study [51]. The floor plan of the medium-sized 
office model has an area of 17,875 ft2 (1,660 m2), which includes spaces for open-plan offices, enclosed 
offices, corridors, storage rooms, and conference rooms (Fig. 5a) [52]. In this study, the floor plan for the 
middle and top floor will be selected. The floor plan of the primary school model has an area of 73,960 ft2 
(6,871 m2), which includes classrooms, library, mechanical room, lobby, cafeteria, kitchen, and gym (Fig. 
5b). The floor plan of the large hotel has an area of 20,355 ft2 (1,891 m2). In this study, in order to 
represent the case with the guest rooms, the floor plan of the second to the fifth floor will be selected and 
include primarily guest rooms (Fig. 5c)  [53]. The Diamond Princess cruise line flor plan (952 × 205 ft) 
was adopted from an online search. The deck plan for the guest rooms was used here [54].  
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Fig. 5 Floor plan of four space types: (a) mid-size office building [52], (b) school [53], (c) hotel [53], and 
(d) cruise ship [54]. 
3.3.1.2. Typical Room layout 
A literature review was conducted to investigate what typical configurations were used before for similar 
studies. The open-plan office is the most commonly studied space. Several studies have reported the 
general information of the open-plan offices. PNNL developed the detailed space types and their area 
based on the data from National Commercial Construction Characteristic (NC3) [55]. National Air 
Filtration Association (NAFA) Foundation defined a typical office space layout in their own study [10]. 
Carter and Zhang [56] analyzed 31 commercial office buildings and defined the area of typical open-plan 
offices. The data is shown in Table 10. Three types of work stations were found in the open-plan office, 
including partitioned cubicles (Fig. 6a) [56], polygon workstations (Fig. 6b) [57], and individual table 
(Fig. 6c)  [58]. In this study, we will focus on the open-plan office with the partitioned cubicles. 
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Table 10 Typical room layout and occupancy density from the literature 
Reference Area [m2] Height [m] Occupancy Density [p/m2] 
Open-Plan Office 
PNNL Medium 162 2.74 0.05 
PNNL Large 537 2.74 0.05 
NAFA Report 500 3 0.05 
ASHRAE N/A N/A 0.05 
BIFMA N/A N/A 0.17 
Classrooms 
PNNL 266 3.96 0.25 
NAFA Report 100 3 0.35 
ASHRAE N/A N/A 0.35 
Hotel Guest Rooms 
PNNL 39 3.96a, 3.05 0.05 
ASHRAE N/A N/A 0.1 
Cruise Line Guest Rooms 
Interior 11-17 2.13b 0.12-0.27 
Ocean View 14 2.13b 0.14-0.21 
Balcony 14 2.13b 0.21 
Suite 78 2.13b 0.06 
a First floor 
b https://boards.cruisecritic.com/topic/697943-our-friend-is-7-feet-2-inches-tall-can-he-cruise/ 
 
Fig. 6 Typical open-plan office layout: (a) partitioned cubicles [56]; (b) polygon workstations [57]; (c) 
individual table [58] 
The classroom is a space that has large occupancy density and, therefore, higher infection risks. The 
typical layout used in PNNL and NAFA’s study has been included in Table 10. Three types of 
configurations were also found in the literature, including classrooms with shared tables (Fig. 7a) [59], 
auditoriums (Fig. 7b) [60], and regular classrooms with individual chairs (Fig. 7c) [61]. 
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Fig. 7 Typical classroom layout: (a) classroom with shared tables [59]; (b) auditoriums [60]; (c) 
classroom with individual chairs [61] 
Usually, there are different types of guest rooms in hotels, including standard rooms with a king bed (Fig. 
8a), standard rooms with two queen beds (Fig. 8b), and suites (Fig. 8c). The study by PNNL developed 
the hotel model with a uniform typical room area 39 m2, which represents a standard room. And also, 
because the standard rooms with two queen-sized beds are the most common room type, this study will 
focus on this type of layout. 
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Fig. 8 Typical hotel guest room layout: (a) king-bed room [62]; (b) standard rooms with two queen 
beds[63]; (c) suites  
Because there is very limited data published for the cruise line guest rooms, an online search was done to 
investigate the typical layout of the cruise line guest rooms. Usually, four types of rooms are available on 
the cruise: interior rooms (Fig. 9a), ocean view rooms (Fig. 9b), balcony rooms (Fig. 9c), and suites (Fig. 
9d). Since the interior room is the one which has the smallest area, the largest occupancy density, and 
possibly the worst ventilation, this study will focus on evaluating the infection risk in the interior room. 
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Fig. 9 Typical cruise line guest room layout [64] 
3.3.1.3. Carrier room layout 
Carrier also provides space layouts for their own interested spaces, including conference center/ballroom, 
bistro/cafeteria, and lobby in the hotel, class and conference room in school, guest rooms in the hotel or 
cruise line, and open-plan office in the office building (Table 11). 
Table 11 Information for Carrier interested spaces 
Space Type Area [m2] Height [m] Exposure [h] 
Hotel    
Conference Center/Ballroom 1,600 7 2 
Bistro/Cafeteria 350 4 0.5 
Lobby 350 4 0.5 
Educational Building    
Classroom 125 4 8 
Conference Room/Small Classroom 40 3 2 
Cruise Line or Hotel    
Guest Room 14 2.5 10 
Office Buildings    
Open-Plan Office 350 3 8 
 
3.3.2. Occupancy density 
The occupancy density of each space defines the required outdoor airflow rate as well as the number of 
susceptible. The occupancy density used in previous studies for four types of buildings is based on typical 
room area and default occupant density in Table 13 from ASHRAE 62.1 [22] summarized in Table 10, 
while occupant numbers in the hospitality guest room and cruise line guest room are assumed to be two. 
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Other than that, Carrier also provided occupancy data for their interested spaces. All these data were 
summarized in Table 12. 
Table 12 Occupancy information 
Typical Room Layout Carrier Room Layout 
Space Type Occupancy [person] Space Type Occupancy [person] 
Hotel  Hotel  
Guest Room 2 Conference Center/Ballroom 750 
  Bistro/Cafeteria 230 
  Lobby 115 
Educational Building  Educational Building  
Classroom 35 Classroom 70 
  Conference Room/Small Classroom 20 
Cruise Line or Hotel  Cruise Line or Hotel  
Guest Room 2 Guest Room 2 
Office Buildings  Office Buildings  
Open-Plan Office 25 Open-Plan Office 18 
 
3.3.3. Outdoor airflow rate 
The outdoor airflow rate required in the breathing zone (λoutdoor or Vbz) of the occupiable space or spaces in 
a ventilation zone shall be not less than the value determined in accordance with ASHRAE 62.1 [65] per 
Eqn. 11. 
𝜆𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑟 = 𝑉𝑏𝑧 = 𝑅𝑝 × 𝑃𝑧 + 𝑅𝑎 × 𝐴𝑧                                                (11) 
where Rp is the outdoor airflow rate required per person, Ra is outdoor airflow rate required per unit floor 
area, Pz is zone population, the number of people in the ventilated space/zone during use and Az is zone 
floor area, the net occupiable floor area of the ventilated space/zone. The minimum average ventilation 
rates in the breathing zone can be determined based on the data in Table 13, which is adapted from 
ASHRAE 62.1 [65]. Mixing ventilation is used in all scenarios, and the indoor room air is assumed to be 
well-mixed.  
Table 13 Minimum ventilation rates in the breathing zone [65]. 
Occupant category 
People outdoor air rate Rp Area outdoor air rate Ra Default occupant density 
CFM/person L/s·person CFM/ft2 L/s·m2 #/1000ft2 or #/100m2 
Office buildings 
Office space 5 2.5 0.06 0.3 5 
Educational facilities 
Classrooms (age 9+) 10 5 0.12 0.6 35 
Hotels, motels, resorts, dormitories 
Bedroom/living room 5 2.5 0.06 0.3 10 
3.3.4. Total supply airflow rate 
The total supply airflow rate (outdoor + recirculated air) is determined based on the total cooling and 
heating load and the temperature difference between the zone supply and return air. The recirculated air 
can be filtered to help further dilute the virus concentration in the ventilated space in addition to the 
dilution by outdoor air supply. With the same outdoor airflow rate, the performance of the filtration 
system increases with the total supply airflow rate. Persily and Gorfain [66] studied more than 100 
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randomly selected U.S. office buildings and calculated the outdoor air fraction for each building (Fig. 10). 
The study found that for buildings with economizers, the outdoor air fraction is very scattered, ranging 
from 0 to 100%. But for buildings without economizers, the outdoor air fraction is around 25%. Therefore, 
a 25% outdoor air fraction (75% recirculation fraction) is suggested by Stephens [67]. The total supply 




                                                           (12) 
 
Fig. 10 Volumetric outdoor air fraction versus outdoor temperature [66] 
Carrier also suggested ranges of total air flow rate for each type of space based on their experience and 
interest. Ranges of total airflow rates were given in Table 14. These values were used for Carrier room 
layouts for risk estimation. 
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Table 14 Total supply flow rate for Carrier room layout 
Space Type Total Supply Flow Rate [cfm/ft2 (ACH)] 
Hotel  
Conference Center/Ballroom 1.5 – 4.0 (3.9 – 10.5) 
Bistro/Cafeteria 1.0 – 3.0 (4.6 – 13.7) 
Lobby 1.0 – 3.0 (4.6 – 13.7) 
Educational Building  
Classroom 1.0 – 3.0 (4.6 – 13.7) 
Conference Room/Small Classroom 1.0 – 2.0 (6.1 – 12.2) 
Cruise Line or Hotel  
Guest Room 0.75 – 1.5 (5.5 – 11.0) 
Office Buildings  
Open-Plan Office 1.0 – 3.0 (6.1 – 18.3) 
 
3.3.5. Filter  
ASHRAE Standard 62.1 [68] requires ‘Particulate matter filters or air cleaners having either 1) a MERV 
of not less than 8 where rated in accordance with ASHRAE Standard 52.2 or 2) the minimum efficiency 
within ISO ePM10 where rated in accordance with ISO 16890 shall be provided upstream of all cooling 
coils or other devices with wetted surfaces through which air is supplied to an occupied space. Therefore, 
in this study, a MERV 8 filter were used in the baseline cases. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Risk estimation of the typical baseline case 
Table 15 summarized the typical configurations of each type of room. The detailed layout of the four 
spaces is shown in Fig. 11. The breathing rate is assumed to be 0.3 m3/h for all scenarios, which is 
determined based on the sedentary activity. The supply airflow rate is estimated by the required outdoor 
airflow rate and a recirculated fraction (75% in this study). MERV 8 filters are used for the recirculated 
air in the HVAC system, which is assumed to be an All Air System with constant outdoor and total 
airflow rates. It is assumed that only one person is infected in the target room, and masks are not used in 
all scenarios. The infection risk for SARS-CoV-2 is estimated based on the proposed model. The 
estimated risks (probabilities of infection) are shown in Table 15. The probability of infection in the 
hospitality room and cruise line are significantly higher than office and classroom, which is mainly due to 
the much higher percent of infected person (1 out of 2 occupants in the room or 50%), lower ventilation 
rate and longer exposure time assumed in the baseline case. 
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Table 15 Typical configurations and risk probability in each type of room. 
Space Space info Occupant HVAC settings Risk 

















m2 m # year m3/h h / m3/(h·person) m3/h m3/h % MERV % 
Office 500 3 25 Adults 0.3 8 Mixing  30.6 765 3060 25 8d 8.662 
Classroom  100 3 35 10-11 0.3  8 Mixing 24.2 846 3384 25 8 10.719 
Hotel GRa  25 3 2 Adults 0.3 10 Mixing 23 45 180 25 8 76.420 
Cruise line GR 15 3 2 Adults 0.3 10 Mixing 17.1 34 137 25 8 94.221 
a GR: guest room;  
b Occupant numbers in office and classroom are estimated based on typical room area and default occupant density from ASHRAE 62.1 [65], while occupant numbers in hospitality guest room and 
cruise line guest room are assumed to be two. 
c Supply air flow rate is estimated by the required outdoor air flow rate and recirculated fraction (75% in this study). The outdoor air flow rate is estimated according to the requirements in AHSRAE 
62.1 [65] . 
d From ASHRAE 62.1 [65].  





Fig. 11 Detailed layout of the four spaces                     
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4.2. Performance evaluation of the individual control strategy on typical baseline 
case 
Necessary strategies are required to be applied in the study scenarios to reduce the infection risk. The 
possible risk control strategies include reduced occupancy density, improved HVAC systems with 
increased outdoor air supply, enhanced filtration and operation control, in-room filtration, and 
disinfection devices [69], improved room configurations, and personal protective equipment (PPE, 
typically masks). The common approach to improve the efficiency of HVAC systems is using higher-
efficiency in-duct filters (e.g., MERV14 or HEPA) as well as increasing the fresh air supply rate (e.g., 
double ventilation rate or 100% outdoor air). Different ventilation modes besides mixing ventilation (MV), 
such as displacement ventilation (DV) and personal ventilation (PV), can be used to improve ventilation 
efficiency, although it may be more expensive and time-consuming to retrofit the existing ventilation 
system.  
In-room devices can also be used for removing pathogens, including using UVGI systems (e.g., upper-
room UVGI) or portable air cleaners. However, the secondary pollutant emission (such as ozone) and 
potential adverse effects on occupant health due to UV irradiation should be considered when using 
UVGI systems indoors. Room configurations, such as the room layout or furniture placement, will affect 
the indoor airflow pattern and ventilation efficiency. A strategy commonly used in office buildings is the 
semi-open space configuration, e.g., workstations with partitions. However, this approach cannot be 
applied in smaller spaces like hospitality guest rooms. Personal protective equipment (e.g., masks) is very 
useful for reducing the infection risk by directly reducing the exhaled pathogens from infectors and the 
inhaled pathogens by the susceptible people. Table 16 shows the possible control strategies which are 
available to be used in different scenarios.  
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Table 16 Proposed control strategies for different scenarios. 
Scenario 
Ventilation  
In-room device Room configuration Mask 
Airflow rate Mode Filter 
Office   
Baseline 
 
ASHRAE 62.1 MV MERV8 None  None  None 
Control Double,  









Semi-open partitions Cloth,  
Surgical,  
N95 
Classroom   
Baseline ASHRAE 62.1 MV MERV8 None  None  None 
Control Double,  









Semi-open partitions Cloth,  
Surgical,  
N95 
Hospitality guest room and bistro   
Baseline ASHRAE 62.1 MV MERV8 None None  None 
Control Double,  








None  None 
Hospitality lobby and ballroom 
Baseline ASHRAE 62.1 MV MERV8 None None  None 
Control Double,  








None  Cloth,  
Surgical,  
N95 
Cruiser line guest room   
Reference ASHRAE 62.1 MV MERV8 None  None  None 
Control Double,  








None  None 
 
The performance of each strategy can then be evaluated using the modified Wells-Riley model. The 
infection risk of applying each possible strategy in the baseline office scenario is estimated in Table 17. It 
can be observed that using masks is the most effective strategy for reducing infection risk. A surgical or 
N95 mask can reduce the infection risk by more than 90%. For HVAC systems, using personal ventilation 
may be the best approach for reducing risk when εvent = 5. The displacement ventilation only reduces the 
infection possibility by 23.9% based on the adopted empirical ventilation efficiency (εvent = 1.5). The 
result greatly depends on the value of ventilation efficiency. Elevating supply airflow rate (double airflow 
rate in this study) or using 100% outdoor air can reduce more risk and reach an equivalent level as using 
HEPA filters in HVAC systems. For in-room filtration and disinfection devices, the upper-room UVGI 
system (0.2W/m2 irradiation with around equivalent 4h-1 air changes) can reduce considerable risk 
compared to the portable air cleaner (CADR=400m3/h). The portable air cleaner used in this study has the 
lowest improvement in reducing infection risk, which can be increased if an air cleaner with a larger 
CADR is used. Semi-open space configuration in the office can reduce the risk by half when εvent = 2.5.  
The various strategies can be combined and integrated to achieve desired risk reduction [7]. The ten 
scenarios suggested by Zhang [8] are estimated for all four types of spaces as in Table 18. The same 
approach and procedure established can be applied to evaluate the effectiveness of additional specific risk 
reduction strategies in further studies. The results demonstrate that with proper integration of the control 
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strategies, it is possible to reduce the risk by a factor of 74.6% to 100% from the baseline scenarios, but 
one should note that all these cases require masks on. 
Table 17 Infection risk estimation of each possible strategy in the baseline office scenario. 
Strategy Feature Risk [%] Improvement [%] 
Reference   Baseline settings in Table 12 8.662 N/A 
Ventilation system Double ventilation rate 3060×2m3/h 5.318 38.6 
100% outdoor air fcirculated = 0% 5.885 32.1 
DV εvent = 1.5 6.595 23.9 
PV εvent = 5 2.461 71.6 
MERV14 ηfilter = 87% 6.349 26.7 
HEPA ηfilter = 99.9% 5.888 32.0 
In-room devices UVGI kUV = 4h-1 a 2.738 69.4 
Air cleaner CADR = 400m3/h; εvent = 1 7.581 12.5 
Room configuration Semi-open space εvent = 2.5 4.456 48.6 
Mask Cloth ηS = ηI = 50% 2.243 74.1 
Surgical ηS = ηI = 75% 0.566 93.6 
N95 ηS = ηI = 95% 0.023 99.7 
a Estimated from [70,71] for 0.2 W/m2 irradiation. 
 








[%] Rate Mode Filter 
Office  
Referencea Reference MV MERV8 None  None 8.662  
1 Double MV MERV14 None  Cloth 0.930 89.2 
2 Double MV MERV14 None  Surgical 0.233 97.3 
3 Double MV MERV14 Semi-open space  Surgical 0.102 98.8 
4 Double DV MERV14 Semi-open space Surgical 0.005 99.9 
5 Double MV HEPA None  Surgical 0.214 97.5 
6 Double MV HEPA Semi-open space  Surgical 0.093 98.9 
7 Double DV HEPA Semi-open space  Surgical 0.005 99.9 
8 Double MV MERV14 None  N95 0.009 99.9 
9 Double MV MERV14 Semi-open space  N95 0.004 99.9 
10 Double DV MERV14 Semi-open space  N95 0 100 
Classroom  
Reference Reference MV MERV8 None  None 10.719  
1 Double MV MERV14 None  Cloth 0.950 91.1 
2 Double MV MERV14 None  Surgical 0.238 97.8 
3 Double MV MERV14 Semi-open space  Surgical 0.097 99.1 
4 Double DV MERV14 Semi-open space Surgical 0.005 100.0 
5 Double MV HEPA None  Surgical 0.216 98.0 
6 Double MV HEPA Semi-open space  Surgical 0.088 99.2 
7 Double DV HEPA Semi-open space  Surgical 0.004 100.0 
8 Double MV MERV14 None  N95 0.010 99.9 
9 Double MV MERV14 Semi-open space  N95 0.004 100.0 
10 Double DV MERV14 Semi-open space  N95 0 100.0 
Hospitality guest room  
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Reference Reference MV MERV8 None  None 76.420  
1 Double MV MERV14 None  Cloth 13.826 81.9 
2 Double MV MERV14 None  Surgical 3.652 95.2 
3 Double MV MERV14 Semi-open space  Surgical 1.610 97.9 
4 Double DV MERV14 Semi-open space Surgical 0.086 99.9 
5 Double MV HEPA None  Surgical 3.348 95.6 
6 Double MV HEPA Semi-open space  Surgical 1.464 98.1 
7 Double DV HEPA Semi-open space  Surgical 0.078 99.9 
8 Double MV MERV14 None  N95 0.149 99.8 
9 Double MV MERV14 Semi-open space  N95 0.065 99.9 
10 Double DV MERV14 Semi-open space  N95 0.003 100.0 
Cruise line guest room  
Reference Reference MV MERV8 None  None 94.221  
1 Double MV MERV14 None  Cloth 23.958 74.6 
2 Double MV MERV14 None  Surgical 6.618 93.0 
3 Double MV MERV14 Semi-open space  Surgical 2.869 97.0 
4 Double DV MERV14 Semi-open space Surgical 0.151 99.8 
5 Double MV HEPA None  Surgical 6.053 93.6 
6 Double MV HEPA Semi-open space  Surgical 2.605 97.2 
7 Double DV HEPA Semi-open space  Surgical 0.137 99.9 
8 Double MV MERV14 None  N95 0.274 99.7 
9 Double MV MERV14 Semi-open space  N95 0.116 99.9 
10 Double DV MERV14 Semi-open space  N95 0.006 100.0 
a Use the baseline settings in Table 12. 
 
4.3. Risk estimation for the Carrier baseline case 
Carrier also provided the configurations and system parameters for more specific spaces of their interests 
(Table 19). To determine the baseline case for Carrier interested spaces, cases with different total supply 
flow rates within the specified range were created and their infection risks were estimated using the 
proposed model. Same as the forementioned typical baseline case, the breathing rate was assumed to be 
0.3 m3/h for all scenarios assuming sedentary activity. MERV 8 filters were used for the recirculated air 
in the HVAC system. It was assumed that only one person was infected in the target room, and masks 
were not used in all scenarios. The estimated risks (probabilities of infection) are shown in Fig. 12. The 
hotel/cruise line guest room has the highest infection risk (~90%) due to high fraction of initial virus 
carrier among the occupants (1 out of 2), while the hotel lobby, bistro, and ballroom have the lowest 
infection risk (0.1-0.2%) due to high total ventilation rate specified for the large number of occupants. 
The conference room, classroom and open-plan office have the medium risk of infection (~10%). For all 
7 spaces, the infection risk decreased with the total supply airflow rate due to the impact of the MERV 8 
filter in the recirculation air duct). Therefore, the worst cases (with the lowest total supply airflow rate) 
were used as the reference for estimating the potential of different risk reduction strategies. 
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Table 19 Space information of Carrier interested cases 








Ventilation (fresh air) Total Supply 




1,600 7 750 2 BL=6.7 cfm/p (0.8 ACH) 
130% BL (1.0 ACH) 
200% BL (1.5 ACH) 
100% OA (3.9 ACH) 
1.5 cfm/ft2  (3.9 ACH) 
2.0 cfm/ft2 (5.2 ACH) 
2.5 cfm/ft2 (6.5 ACH) 
3.0 cfm/ft2 (7.8 ACH) 
3.5 cfm/ft2 (9.1 ACH) 
4.0 cfm/ft2 (10.5 ACH) 
Hotel Bistro/Cafeteria 350 4  230 0.5 BL=9.0 cfm/p (2.5 ACH) 
130% BL (3.3 ACH) 
 
100% OA (4.6 ACH) 
1.0 cfm/ft2 (4.6 ACH) 
1.5 cfm/ft2 (6.9 ACH) 
2.0 cfm/ft2 (9.1 ACH) 
2.5 cfm/ft2 (11.4 ACH) 
3.0 cfm/ft2 (13.7 ACH) 
Hotel lobby 350 4 115 0.5 BL=10.0 cfm/p (1.4 ACH) 
130% BL (1.8 ACH) 
200% BL (2.8 ACH) 
100% OA (4.6 ACH) 
1.0 cfm/ft2 (4.6 ACH) 
1.5 cfm/ft2 (6.9 ACH) 
2.0 cfm/ft2 (9.1 ACH) 
2.5 cfm/ft2 (11.4 ACH) 
3.0 cfm/ft2 (13.7 ACH) 
Classroom (Lecture) 125 4 70 8 BL=9.2 cfm/p (2.2 ACH) 
130% BL (2.8 ACH) 
200% BL (4.4 ACH) 
100% OA (4.6 ACH) 
1.0 cfm/ft2 (4.6 ACH) 
1.5 cfm/ft2 (6.9 ACH) 
2.0 cfm/ft2 (9.1 ACH) 
2.5 cfm/ft2 (11.4 ACH) 
3.0 cfm/ft2 (13.7 ACH) 
Conference room/Small 
Classroom 
40 3 20 2 BL=6.6 cfm/p (1.9 ACH) 
130% BL (2.4 ACH) 
200% BL (3.7 ACH) 
100% OA (6.1 ACH) 
1.0 cfm/ft2 (6.1 ACH) 
1.25 cfm/ft2 (7.6 ACH) 
1.5 cfm/ft2 (9.1 ACH) 
1.75 cfm/ft2 (10.7 ACH) 
2.0 cfm/ft2 (12.2 ACH) 
Guest Room 14 2.5 2 10 BL=9.7 cfm/p (0.9 ACH) 
130% BL (1.2 ACH) 
200% BL (1.9 ACH) 
100% OA (5.5 ACH) 
0.75 cfm/ft2 (5.5 ACH) 
1.0 cfm/ft2 (7.3 ACH) 
1.25 cfm/ft2 (9.1 ACH) 
1.5 cfm/ft2 (11.0 ACH) 
Open-Plan Office 350 3 18 8 BL=17.7 cfm/p (0.5 ACH) 
130% BL (0.7 ACH) 
200% BL (1.0 ACH) 
100% OA (6.1 ACH) 
1.0 cfm/ft2 (6.1 ACH) 
1.5 cfm/ft2 (9.1 ACH) 
2.0 cfm/ft2 (12.2 ACH) 
2.5 cfm/ft2 (15.2 ACH) 




Fig. 12 Risk of infection vs. total supply airflow rate 
4.4. Performance evaluation of the individual control strategy on Carrier baseline 
case 
A series of control strategies have been identified for mitigating the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 as 
discussed in Sec. 4.2. Similar control strategies were tested for Carrier interested spaces. These strategies 
can be classified into four categories: 1) ventilation system, including better air distribution system such 
as displacement ventilation, increased total supply air flow rate, increased ventilation rate (baseline level 
per ASHRAE 62.1, 130% baseline level per ASHRAE 189.1 [72],  200% baseline level per COGfx study 
[73], and 100% outdoor air), and improved filtration system (MERV 8 to MERV 13); 2) in-room air 
cleaning, including UVGI and portable air cleaner (with 5 cfm/p, 10 cfm/p, and 15 cfm/p CADR); 3) 
room configuration, e.g. semi-open space; and 4) masks, including cloth mask, surgical mask and N95 
masks. Each control strategy is tested individually first for each type of spaces to evaluate their 
effectiveness. 
4.4.1. Conference center/ballroom 
The performance of each control strategy in the conference center/ballroom is summarized in Fig. 13. 
Because of the large floor area, high occupancy, and large amount of outdoor air and total supply air, the 
infection risk of the baseline case is only 0.23%. The most effective strategy is wearing N95 mask, which 
can reduce the risk to almost 0%. Even with a cloth mask, the risk of infection can be reduced to 0.11%. 
As discussed before, the risk of infection reduces with the total supply airflow rate. With 100% outdoor 
air, the risk of infection can be reduced from 0.23% to 0.13%. Usually MERV 8 filter can be replaced 
with up to MERV 13 filter without significant system modification. Therefore, MERV 8-13 filters are 
tested and results show that MERV 13 filter can reduce the risk to 0.15% by filtering the recirculated air. 
The performance of the portable air cleaners is tested based on four levels of CADR per person. It was 
shown that increasing the CADR with the air cleaners by 15 cfm/p can reduce the risk to 0.13%. However, 
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the benefit of increasing total supply flow rate and clean air delivered by the air cleaner and upgrading the 
filtration system decreases with further upgrading. For example, increasing the total supply flow rate from 
1.5 to 2.0 cfm/ft2 reduces more risk than increasing the total supply flowrate from 2.0 to 2.5 cfm/ft2. The 
potential of each risk reduction strategy is summarized in Fig. 14. Since the cloth mask is the more 
readily available and more frequently used in daily life, it is used for evaluating the potential of the mask. 
It was shown that increasing the total supply airflow rate, using the UVGI and semi-open space can all 
achieve more risk reduction than the cloth mask. The best environmental control strategy is the UVGI 
system which can reduce the infection risk by 65% while the cloth mask can only provide 52% reduction 
in risk. The other four strategies, displacement ventilation, 100% outdoor air, MERV 13, and air cleaner, 
can reduce the infection risk by 30%, 43%, 35%, and 43% from the baseline condition, respectively. 
 
Fig. 13 Effects of individual risk reduction strategies for conference center/ballroom 
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Fig. 14 Potential of individual risk reduction strategy for conference center/ballroom 
4.4.2. Hotel bistro/cafeteria 
The performance of each control strategy in the bistro/cafeteria is summarized in Fig. 15. Similar to the 
conference center/ballroom, the infection risk of the baseline case is only 0.28% due to the high 
ventilation rate and total supply airflow rate as well as the shorter exposure (0.5h). The most effective 
strategy is still wearing N95 mask, which can reduce the risk to almost 0%. A cloth mask can reduce the 
risk to 0.11%. Increasing the total supply airflow rate, ventilation rate and clean air by air cleaners and 
upgrading the filter can all help reduce the infection risk. One should note that since in the baseline case 
the ventilation rate is more than 50% of the total air flow rate, 200% baseline outdoor air is not included 
in this analysis. The potential of each risk reduction strategy is summarized in Fig. 16. It was shown that 
increasing the clean air delivered by the air cleaners and semi-open space can all achieve more risk 
reduction than the cloth mask while increasing the total supply airflow rate and UVGI reduce the risk by 
similar amount to the cloth mask. The best environmental control strategy is the semi-open space which 
can reduce the infection risk by 57% while the cloth mask can provide 50% reduction in risk. The other 
three strategies, displacement ventilation, 100% outdoor air, and MERV 13 filter, can reduce the infection 
risk by 32%, 25%, and 18%, respectively. 
 35 
 
Fig. 15 Effects of individual risk reduction strategies for bistro/cafeteria 
 
Fig. 16 Potential of individual risk reduction strategy for bistro/cafeteria 
4.4.3. Hotel lobby  
The performance of each control strategy in the lobby area is summarized in Fig. 17. Compared with the 
bistro/cafeteria, the lobby area has only half occupancy, and therefore, the infection risk of the baseline 
case is a little higher than the previous case. The N95 mask can still reduce the risk of infection to 0% and 
a cloth mask can reduce the risk to 0.16%. The potential of each risk reduction strategy is summarized in 
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Fig. 18. It was shown that increasing the total supply airflow rate, UVGI and semi-open space can reduce 
the risk of infection by 55% which is better than the cloth mask (52%). The other four strategies, 
displacement ventilation, 100% outdoor air, MERV 13 filter, and portable air cleaners, can reduce the 
infection risk by 30%, 36%, 27%, and 39%, respectively. 
 
Fig. 17 Effects of individual risk reduction strategies for lobby area 
 
Fig. 18 Potential of individual risk reduction strategy for hotel lobby 
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4.4.4. Classroom (lecture) 
The performance of each control strategy in the classroom is summarized in Fig. 19. Due to the smaller 
ventilation and total supply flow rate and longer exposure time (8h) compared with the first three cases, 
the infection risk of the baseline case is 12.31%. The most effective strategy is still wearing N95 mask, 
but the risk of infection while wearing N95 mask is 0.03%. The cloth mask can also reduce the risk by 
around 50% to 6.23%. The potential of each risk reduction strategy is summarized in Fig. 20. It was 
shown that increasing the total supply airflow rate, using the UVGI and semi-open space can reduce the 
risk of infection by 50%, 51%, and 55%, respectively, which are all higher than the cloth mask can do. 
The best environmental control strategy is using the semi-open space which can reduce the infection risk 
by 55% while the cloth mask can only provide 49% reduction in risk. The other four strategies, 
displacement ventilation, 100% outdoor air, MERV 13 filter, and air cleaner, can reduce the infection risk 
by 29%, 26%, 19%, and 48%, respectively. 
 
Fig. 19 Effects of individual risk reduction strategies for classroom (lecture) 
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Fig. 20 Potential of individual risk reduction strategy for classroom (lecture) 
4.4.5. Conference room/small classroom 
The performance of each control strategy in the conference room/small classroom is summarized in Fig. 
21. The infection risk of the baseline case is 11.05%. Wearing N95 mask reduces the risk of infection the 
most to 0.03%. The cloth mask can also reduce the risk to 5.58%. The potential of each risk reduction 
strategy is summarized in Fig. 22. It is shown that the best environmental control strategy is the semi-
open space, and it is the only strategy which can reduce the risk of infection (by 55%) more than the cloth 
mask (50%). The other six strategies, displacement ventilation, increased total supply airflow rate, 100% 
outdoor air, MERV 13 filter, UVGI, and air cleaner, can reduce the infection risk by 29%, 37%, 35%, 
27%, 47%, and 48%, respectively. 
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Fig. 21 Effects of individual risk reduction strategies for conference room/small classroom 
 
Fig. 22 Potential of individual risk reduction strategy for conference room/small classroom 
4.4.6. Hotel/cruise line guest room 
The performance of each control strategy in the hotel/cruise line guest room is summarized in Fig. 23. 
Because the room is only occupied by two people and very limited amount of outdoor and supply airflow 
rate, the infection risk of the baseline case is as high as 90.71%. By wearing the N95 mask, the risk can be 
reduced to 0.59% which is the most significant reduction. With the cloth mask, the risk of infection is still 
68.79%. The potential of each risk reduction strategy is summarized in Fig. 24. It was shown that none of 
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the control strategies can reduce the risk of infection by more than 50%. The best environmental control 
strategy is using the semi-open space which can reduce the infection risk by 27% while the cloth mask 
can only provide 24% reduction in risk. However, implementing semi-open space in the guest room is 
usually not possible. The other six strategies, displacement ventilation, increased total supply airflow rate, 
100% outdoor air, MERV 13 filter, UVGI, and air cleaner, can reduce the infection risk by 10%, 16%, 
17%, 12%, 25%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Fig. 23 Effects of individual risk reduction strategies for hotel/cruise line guest room 
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Fig. 24 Potential of individual risk reduction strategy for hotel/cruise line guest room 
4.4.7. Open plan office 
The performance of each control strategy in the open-plan office is summarized in Fig. 25. The infection 
risk of the baseline case is 6.32%. The most effective strategy is still wearing N95 mask, but the risk of 
infection while wearing N95 mask is 0.02%. The cloth mask can also reduce the risk by around 50% to 
3.15%. The potential of each risk reduction strategy is summarized in Fig. 26. Increasing the total supply 
airflow rate, UVGI and semi-open space can reduce the risk of infection by 59%, 53%, and 55%, 
respectively, which outperform the cloth mask. The best environmental control strategy is increasing the 
total supply airflow rate to 3 cfm/ft2 which can reduce the infection risk by 59% while the cloth mask can 
only provide 50% reduction in risk. The other four strategies, displacement ventilation, 100% outdoor air, 
MERV 13 filter, and air cleaner, can reduce the infection risk by 29%, 47%, 38%, and 11%, respectively. 
 42 
 
Fig. 25 Effects of individual risk reduction strategies for open-plan office 
 
Fig. 26 Potential of individual risk reduction strategy for open-plan office 
4.5. Performance evaluation of combined control strategies on Carrier baseline case 
The most commonly used building engineering strategies include increased outdoor air, improved 
filtration system (filter with better efficiency), and portable air cleaner. Fig. 27 summarizes the risk 
reduction potential of these three strategies in seven Carrier cases. All these risk reduction potentials were 
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calculated relative to the baseline case and ranged between 0 and 60%. Similar to the previous findings 
for the general space types, the combined performance of the three strategies is comparatively small for 
hotel/cruise line guest rooms. This is because the guest room had the lowest occupancy and therefore 
lowest baseline outdoor airflow rate, total supply flow rate, and clean air provided by air cleaners (CADR 
assumed based on occupancy), and yet had the highest fraction of virus carriers among the occupants (1 
out of 2) assumed. Increasing the outdoor airflow rate and CADR by air cleaners and improving the 
filtration system are all very effective ways to reduce the risk. With the increase of the outdoor air, the 
benefits of the filter for recirculation air diminished. When 100% outdoor air was provided, no 
improvement could be provided by the better filtration system, because no recirculation air was provided. 
The benefit of the portable air cleaners also diminished when the CADR increased beyond 10-15 cfm/p. 
Increasing the outdoor air fraction is not as effective as increasing the equivalent CADR by the portable 
air cleaners since it reduces the recirculation air and hence the impacts of the MERV filter. In addition, 
increasing MERV 13 to MERV 16 does not reduce the risk significantly in all the simulated cases, yet it 
may dramatically increase the retrofit and operation cost of the HVAC system. Therefore, as a basic 
mitigation strategy. MERV 13 is recommended, which requires no major modification to typical existing 
air handling systems. MERV 16 or HEPA filters are considered as premium mitigation strategy for 
further reducing the risk and additional assurance considering the possible conditions where virus-




Fig. 27 Potential of Combined Risk Reduction Strategies
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4.6. Integrated (Layered) Control Strategies 
All the strategies mentioned above require modification or retrofit of either the configuration of the 
system of the spaces, and therefore some necessary cost. Depending on the efforts and costs needed, three 
levels of integrated control strategies were proposed and evaluated with selected spaces: 
1. Basic (without major system retrofit): 
a) 100%, 130% or 200% BL OA, respectively 
b) a)+MERV 13 (within the capacity of existing system) 
c) b)+15 cfm/p CADR (low-cost standalone air cleaners, flexible, easy to deploy) 
d) b)+30 cfm/p CADR (more standalone air cleaners or supper air cleaners such as higher end 
UVGI in-duct or upper room UVGI) 
e) b)+60 cfm/p CADR (supper air cleaners/disinfectors) 
2. Intermediate – semi-open partition + airflow pattern management (mixing or displacement room 
air distribution) – require more expertise and some materials 
3. Premium: 
f) Personal environmental control 
g) System retrofit to accommodate MERV 16 or HEPA filters. This is only for worst case 
condition where majority of virus containing particles are <1.0 µm such as found in medical 
PPE change rooms, or for enhanced safety precaution given the uncertainty in virus 
distribution among different particle sizes. 
Fig. 28 shows the calculated risk of infection of the layered approaches for seven spaces, which could be 
categorized into three groups, i.e.  high occupancy and short exposure (ballroom, bistro/cafeteria, lobby), 
medium occupancy and medium exposure (classroom, conference room, open plan office), and low 
occupancy and long exposure (guest room). It indicates that consistent with the findings of previous 
sections, wearing masks can reduce the risk significantly (about 50% with cloth mask). Similar level of 
risk reduction can be achieved by installing MERV 13 filter and supplement 15 cfm/p with in-room air 
cleaners. When MERV 13 filter is used, increasing the outdoor air flow rate has reduced effects on risk 
reduction while may lead to significant increase in heating or cooling energy consumption. The benefit of 
increasing the CADR by air cleaners beyond 15 cfm/p also diminishes for all the space types except for 
the guest room scenario. For example, 22% reduction of the risk was achieved by providing 15 cfm/p 
CADR, but further reducing the risk by 22% requires 45 cfm/p more CADR. Both the basic and 
intermediate approaches can reduce the risk to almost the same level, especially for high-occupancy-
short-exposure and medium-occupancy-medium-exposure spaces, but the additional cost of the basic 
approach come mostly from minor system retrofit and/or adjustment to the system operation while the 
intermediate approach’s cost comes mostly from modification of the room and duct configurations, and 
requires more design expertise for space air distribution/diffusion. The premium approach is the most 
effective one which can reduce the risk to 0% when both local supply and local exhaust are used 




Fig. 28 Performance of layered control strategies (a. ballroom; b. bistro/cafeteria; c. lobby; d. classroom; 
e. conference room; f. hotel/cruise line guest room; g. open plan office) 
4.7. Estimated risk reduction from air cleaning products identified by Carrier 
In addition, the performance of several Carrier selected products (air cleaners) has been evaluated using 
the proposed model. The experimentally determined CADR of these products are given in Table 20. The 
risks of infection using these products in selected spaces are shown in Fig. 29. The results have indicated 
that the performance of these products is positively correlated to the CADR of the product. Product 1 also 
provides the best risk reduction. Even in the guest room (baseline infection risk is as high as 91%), this 
product can still reduce the infection risk to around 0.1%. 
Table 20 Product information 
Product CADR [cfm] 
Product 1 – 219,544CFM 219,544 
Product 1 – 105,381CFM 105,381 
Product 2  976 
AVLI 45,344 
KLARWIND – 2,140CFM 2,140 




Fig. 29 Performance of selected products (a. ballroom; b. bistro/cafeteria; c. lobby; d. classroom; e. 
conference room; f. hotel/cruise line guest room; g. open plan office) 
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5. Conclusions 
A method and procedure has been developed for estimating the COVID 19 infectious risk due to exposure 
to SARS-CoV-2. We used a widely adopted airborne disease infection risk model (Wells-Riley equation) 
to investigate the infection risk of the SARS-CoV-2 in some typical indoor spaces in office buildings, 
educational buildings, hotels, and cruise ship. Risk analysis were also performed for the seven (7) specific 
space types defined by Carrier to evaluate the effectiveness of different levels of increased ventilation, 
enhanced filtration and equivalent clean air delivery rate (CADR) by using room air cleaners. The original 
Wells-Riley equation was modified to account for the effects of mask filter efficiency, virus distribution 
in different size of particles, recirculated air filter efficiency, particle deposition rate in the space, room air 
ventilation efficiency (as affected by the space air diffusion, internal partitions, and locations of 
susceptible and infectors) as well as the outdoor ventilation rate. The quantum generation rate per infector 
for SARS-CoV-2 was derived from the published SARS-CoV-2 case studies available to date. Baseline 
cases were established based on the literature and online survey as well as Carrier’s previous projects to 
represent the typical configurations in selected types of indoor spaces. The IAQ control strategies, 
including increasing the ventilation rate, improving the ventilation efficiency by changing the air 
distribution system, improving the air filtration system, the use of the personal protection equipment, etc., 
were evaluated for their individual and combined effectiveness in risk reduction against the baseline cases. 
Some major findings are summarized below: 
1. Wearing the mask is the most cost-effective way to provide protections. A cloth mask can usually 
reduce the infection risk by 50%. A similar level of risk reduction is achievable by installing 
MERV 13 filter and supplement 15 cfm/p CADR with room air cleaners. 
2. Depending on the space type, some engineering approaches including more total supply air, 
UVGI, portable air cleaner and semi-open space can provide more protection than a cloth mask. 
3. The benefit of increasing total supply flow rate and clean air delivered by the air cleaner and 
upgrading the filtration system decreases with the increase of the total “equivalent” clean air 
delivery rate. 
4. The benefit of the portable air cleaners also diminished when the CADR increased beyond 10-15 
cfm/p for all the space types studied except for the guest room case where high baseline infection 
risk was present.  
5. Increasing the outdoor airflow rate is not as effective as increasing the same amount of CADR 
provided by the portable air cleaners since increasing the outdoor airflow rate will also reduce the 
recirculation air which can also help reduce the risk when properly filtered.  
6. Installing a MERV 13 filter in the recirculation air duct is recommended as a basic mitigation 
strategy. Increasing MERV 13 to MERV 16 does not further reduce the risk significantly for all 
the cases studied but it may dramatically increase the retrofit and operation cost of the HVAC 
system. 
7. With the MERV filter in place, increasing the outdoor air flow rate has less effect in reducing the 
risk because it deceases the amount of air through the MERV filter. 
8. The basic and intermediate approaches can reduce the risk to almost the same level while the 
premium approach is the most effective one which can reduce the risk to 0% although it may not 
be applicable for all the spaces. 
9. The performance of portable air cleaner is positively correlated to its CADR. Product 1 can 
reduce the infection risk to below 0.1% level. 
Further studies will focus on extending the current model to include unsteady-state conditions and 
account for uncertainties in the model parameters such as the quantum generation rate, virus distribution 
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among different particle size ranges, inhalation flow rates, and occupant exposure times, and test and 
validate the performance of the selected mitigation strategies by experiment. In addition, the inter-zonal 
cross-contamination and detailed zonal virus distribution under different room configurations, and for 
specific application scenarios are also needed to understand the spatial distribution of virus inside a room 
and its impact on the dose exposure and associated infection risk. 
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